Conciousness (101 mins) and Character (103 mins)
– two lectures by Daniel Robinson
Given at St Olaf College, USA in 2013 by Dan Robinson (1937 – 2018) of the University of Oxford.
In re-presenting these lectures, we are especially thinking of an audience of politicians and civil servants. You – politicians – are politicians of the modern period, subject to significant intellectual and cultural pressure; much coming from our economy, finance and science. And, civil servants – you must serve politicians in shaping our public lives, subject to similar pressures, and must keep abreast of science, progress, psychology and management ideas, realising them for politicians and for action towards the public good. Dan Robinson has something important to say to us. If you’ve never encountered Daniel Robinson perhaps he is is best introduced in his own words from the Q & A session at the end of the first lecture…
Robinson: “My life divides itself remarkably into two twenty-five year sections. I spent so much time on the bio-physics of vision and brain function, and so forth, devoted to ‘How does it work?‘ And then the next twenty-five years have been devoted to ‘What does it mean?’ This is the best I can do with conciousness – I told you at the outset that there isn’t anything original here – I want to raise certain challenges against what is beginning to look like a received wisdom, a received wisdom about conciousness that isn’t really very wise.”
Conciousness
OVERVIEW:
(0.30) What we yearn to know about the mental life is already widely known, although the mode of knowing seems to be too innocent to count as knowledge. (1.30) Human character is already well documented in the history of human life on earth. (1.45) There are no mysteries, yet conciouness and character stubbornly refuse to be absorbed into the developed sciences. (2.20) Nature seldom mimics theories. How can there be a real x and at the same time an x seemimgly beyond the reach of science? (2.49) Before science there were other forms of truth-telling authority. (4.10) No mode of knowing ever had it within itself to establish its own authority, and humans reluctantly tend to invoke pragmatic criteria when choosing a specific method to address a specific problem. (5.10) Items generically and ambiguously referred to as ‘mental’ have held out against the sciences, with conscienousness as the most stubborn and unresponsive in the ‘brain sciences’. (6.50) Concisousness cannot be a ‘brain state’. (7.50) Neuro-philosophy dates back to the ancients. (8.45) The mind / body problem has remained unchanged over two milennia. (9.10) The claim that consciousness is a ‘brain process’ is scientistic bravado. To know that x causally brings about y is not to know what y is. The brain is part of the body – an integrated system. Concisousness is not a ‘brain state’. (11.50) Might we consider ‘consciousness’ as a term unfit for any scientific purpose? Science has many examples of adding to knowledge by subtraction. The idea of ‘ether’ dominated science in the 19th century and we only added to our knowledge when we eliminated it. So too with witches. Many serious judicials systems carefully tested for witches. We were only able to rid ourselves of this business by finally accepting there weren’t any witches in the first place – the ontology of the thing was empty. When the idea of witches was abandoned there was epistemic addition by ontological subtraction. (14.40) We might make progress in the pseudo-problem of consciousness if it were removed as an idea, as with ether and witches. (15.00) American philosopher William James (1842 – 1910) rejected consciosuness as a localised thing or process. The great scientist Thomas Huxley (1825 – 1895), Darwin’s bulldog, thought scientific approaches to conciousness a hopeless task. Gilbert Ryle (1900 – 1976) shows the problem to be a category mistake. (19.10) The goal here was to get the ghost out of the machine; I shall be arguing that my task is to get the machine out of the ghost. (19.25) Some statements of neurology do faithfully translate some statements about mental life, (21.40) and consciousness remains durable as an idea in research institutes. (22.35) David Chalmers’ work on ‘philosophical zombies’ raises questions about physicalism. Everything we do, from making toast to flying to the moon, could be done by a series of movements not accompanied by conscioussness. (27.55) The main point is a truism and a brute fact. There is a gap between the physicalistic model and actual experience – a gap which refuses to close. (28.30) Continual persistence at a failure in this area of philosophy of mind by academics might be compared with the clinical diagnoses of obessive compulsive disorder. (29.30) Perhaps surprisingly, talk of conciousness is of relatively recent origin. The word perhaps didn’t enter Chinese until the 19th century. John Locke’s (1632 – 1704) use of the term was new. He referred to an individuated arena – call it the mind – filed up with entities – call them ideas – and accessed introspectively. Previously ‘consciousness’ was understood in English from its Latin roots – shared knowledge. ‘Knowing or sharing the knowledge of anything with another’. In the 17th century the word consciousness takes on the character that would make it a philosophical problem today. (34.12) The ancients took the mindy/body problem seriously. In Aristotle’s time there were versions of ‘modularity theories’. Aristotle offered a schoolmaster’s correction: “To say that it’s the soul which is angry is as if we were to say that it is the soul that weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities, or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this, with a soul.” A brain doesn’t build houses. People do. Human activities arise not from parts of bodies, but from human beings capable of developing the means by which to secure intended ends. Aristotle was not guilty of the ‘neurological fallacy’. (36.45) Aristotle took consciousness to be an intrinsic feature of human life and a higher order process, saying, “We perceive that we are perceiving… since we can perceive that we see and hear, it must be either by sight itself, or by some other sense, and either the process will go on ad infinitum, or a sense must perceive itself and its activity.” So the conscious awareness is built into the process itself – you don’t need something separate from it. (38.00) Perception carries conscious awareness with it. Aristotle adopts the common sense understanding that thought and experience are unified. (38.40) Aristotle didn’t have our problem of consciousness because he was not phobic about gaps. Modern thought takes the maxim ‘physics is complete’, which creates an explanatory gap. Into this embarrassing gap we pour metaphysical refinements and scientific data attempting understanding and causal closure. (40.20) There’s an expectation that the whatever succeeds with easier things ought to be successful with consciousness. Why can’t ‘consciousness’ be explained in the same way as ‘breakfast’? How could a comprehensive account of breakfast be made? That this sounds ‘folksy’ is a positive. What criteria have to be satisfied to say that something has been explained? (42.20) It is not possible to find explanations using the ‘manipulability criteria’ for a causal approach. (44.15) The mechanistic approach is a lazy way of seeking explanation. (46.20) Today’s mechanistic approaches to mental function stubbornly assume some means by which the physics of the nervous system brings about events of a radically different nature. This creates epi-phenominalism; a counterfeit form of dualism. (48.45) A mathematical account of consciouness might yet be found in the equations of quantum mechanics, liberating the ‘physical’ from primitive notions of matter. (53.30) “What is consciousness for?” Probability? There seems to be little evolutionary point to consciousness except as an aid to planning a future. A past that can be brought into consciousness as a means by which to engage the future, often the immediate future. Consciousness is distinct, in this way from memory and awareness. (55.30) Further, only a conscious being has an adequate warrant in concluding there are conscious minds other than one’s own. Conciousness is the precondition of ascribing mental life to others – people relevantly like ourselves. It reaches back to the pre-Lockean term – something knowingly shared. Consciousness brokers responsibility – the starting point of a moral and civic psychology. (57.05) A science of consciousness would be a credible and systematic account of the manner in which knowledge, desire, belief and judgement come to be integrated into action plans by entities that have an interest – and take an interest – in themselves and others. This science is not to be confused with brain science. It is rather more like that political science advanced by Aristotle, for a flourishing life. (57.40) A major obstacle to scholarship is distraction, which then mistakes distraction for progress. (59.00) It is in the actual lived life of real persons that a human science finds its challenge and its data. The valid human science is that very folk psychology ironically depreciated by many who, in the absence of folk psychology, would have no subject at all. QUESTIONS & ANSWERS (63.50) The issue of personal identity remains interesting in philosophy. How can there be a persistent identity in a system in constant flux? (65.40) A useful way of describing human identity in the English language might employ the terms self, self-identity and personal identity. This might be more helpful than current academic usage of descriptions about identity, but scholars are resistant to change. (68.15) Consciousness is for the civic. First it is the basis on which I ascribe a mental life to others, by inference. Second, in doing this I provide content to bear the weight of responsibility. I add to that a set of expectations and desires from mental bearing , morrally equipped others. One begins to see the possibility of an ordered state. (71.10) My life divides itself remarkably in two twenty-five year sections. I spent so much time on the bio-physics of vision and brain function, and so forth, devoted to ‘How does it work?‘ And then the next twenty-five years have been devoted to ‘What does it mean?’ I want to raise certain challenges against what is beginning to look like a received wisdom that isn’t really very wise. (77.45) My early obsession was with the visiual process. We were interested in vision, not seeing. Folk psycholgy assumes that we’re really interested in seeing, and whether we know all about that by knowing about vision is an open question. Scientistic approaches begin with the assumption that if you know everything about the visual process there’s nothing in seeing that’s left over.
Character
OVERVIEW:
(0.00) An anecdote about the invitation from American psycholgist Martin Seligman to take part in a project to develop the new field of Positive Psychology, working with Bob Nozick, Edward Diener, Mihaly Robert Csikszentmihalyi, Kathleen Jamieson and George Gallup, contributing insights into what the Ancient Greek considered to be a good life. I outlined Aristotle’s approach to the nature of the flourishing life, but my remarks created unease in the party. This approach, it was said, wouldn’t suit the American Pyscholgical Association. When ‘job satisfaction’ was discussed I made the point that, on Aristotle’s account, the aim of an activity cannot be mere satisfaction – not everything desired is desirable. (11.55) There is an aspect of human nature that renders us fit for civic life, conscious of the comparable conditions of sentiment, motivation, desire and intelligence that we share with others. (12.30) Credible content for ‘human nature’ must come by way of history – how the endeavours of the past and our endeavours might be judged in the ripeness of time. The centre of the matter will be the pragmatic question of whether the various undertakings promote a form of life somehow right for the creature that is living it. Did it have the human person … what? The Greeks had a word for it… Aristotle called it ‘Eudaimonia’ – flourishing, good fortune or well being – revealed less by outwards signs, than inner qualities – and a form of lived life that is yours; it’s authentic. (15.00) Anecdote about the richly psychological epics of Homer and the homecoming of Odysseus, whose journey was neither easy nor pleasurable. But flourishing for Odysseus is a realizing of what is most vaulable in the life of Odysseus. (20.21) The question of who is most fortunate is an interesting question. Who is the most fortunate of all the people you know? (20.40) The Greek story of Solon and the wealthy Creosus. Creosus asks if there is anyone more fortunate than he. Solon replies, Yes. He recounts the lives and deaths in service of Tellus and the brothers Cleobis and Biton. Their character and actions elevated them as fortunate. (26.00) This ancient view seems distant when compared with David Hume’s philosophy that has shaped our notions of utility, value, worthiness, right and wrong – the content of our present ethical and moral precepts, and the foundations of a flourishing life. Morality for Hume is sentiment. The overarching principle is that of utility. Utility and feelings of enjoyment go together in human development.(30.20) But Solon rejected the position taken by Hume, and Hume’s is one of the most brilliant, deepest and best argued theories of this sort. (32.30) G. E. Moore addressed the psychology and philosophy of sentiment in Hume’s approach, and shows it to be opaque – not allowing for shared moral knowledge nor any intelligible difference of moral judgement. Hume’s theory would grant Creosus the standing he failed to gain from Solon. (35.10) John Stuart Mill, the most influential disciple of Hume, fares no better and makes the naturalistic fallacy, attributing non-natural moral properties to natural properties. Mill’s utilitarianism is at root a quasi-behaviourist philosophy. Mill makes a mistake, becasue not everything that is desired is desirable. (38.45) The Greeks understood human nature as referring to a rational animal, disposed to social and political modes of life. Aristotle, providing a psychological account of how we deal with pleasure and make choices, is clear that some things are chosen by humans not becasue they bring pleasure – they are chosen for some intrinsic value they have, beyond considerations of sentiment or pleasure. A pride in negotiating this form of life is rightly earned. (41.20) Investigations and action based on sentiment alone cannot produce a culture of human flourishing. Aristotle was clear that a eudaimonic state of affairs is involved in human action, not as ideals, but as the practically civic. Basic “goods” are a form of civic and domestic life, giving command over appetites and passions. (44.20) In the Nichomancean Ethics a famous treatise on friendship is offered by Aristotle. Three basis for friendship are identified – friendship that gives each party sensual pleasure, friendship which is useful and thirdly, perfected friendship that takes as it basis the wellbeing and flourishing of the other, for the sake of the other. And there can be nothing that serves the other as the cultivation of virtue. Happiness is associated with virtue – what is authentically best in us – no matter what this is. (50.05) Aristotle was open as to whether this comes through ‘reason’, but the form in question is cultivated over a lifetime. There’s something about us that renders us fit for a rational rule of law – ordered liberty. Emotions are part of our nature. Do you have the right dispositions for your emotions? (53.10) Ruskin says, “great nations write their autobiographies on three manuscripts: the book of their deeds, the book of their words and the book of thier art… of the three the only trustworthy one is the last.” The Greeks reaslised the importance of art. The subtle aspects of the environment might affect one’s receptivity to what is good, less good and no good. Convenience and mediocrity affects humans. (56.30) Greek culture was in contact and connected with diverse cultures. The most significant thinkers of Greece and Rome were persuaded that there were fundamental moral and juridical precepts that were right for human beings wherever they are found. Equity is universal – a law of nature, and the basis upon which written law commands our obedience. You couldn’t trade otherwise. We celebrate diversity today but still confer on institutions the proclamation of universal human rights. I only have an approximate idea of what rights may be – but those rights need to be connected to the development of the sort of creatures that the rightholders are. (61.34) There is a real world, unwilling and unable to abandon reality in order to ease the burden borne by philosophers. The official psychology must remain that folk psychology that we only abandon in the seminar room. The real life of this folk psychology is guaranteed by the nature of things. QUESTIONS & ANSWERS (63.35) Aristotle distinugishes between things done with and without intention. Cultivation of virtue is an active process. The Roman word is virtue – the Greek is excellence. Greek art is the daily representation of the proper object of aspiration. Keep the ideal in mind. (69.10) What you should be striving for is the best of the characteristics that you have. (71.15) There are stable features of personality, over time and conditions. I try desperatly not to be a psychologist, but when I am one I’m a good one. Our ancestors had an inner impulse towards self-perfection. Decent people keep promises.
ABOUT DANIEL ROBINSON
Daniel N. Robinson (1937–2018) was Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Georgetown University; a Faculty Fellow of Philosophy st Linacre College, Oxford University.
Professor Robinson’s work specialized in moral philosophy, philosophy of psychology, legal philosophy, the philosophy of the mind, intellectual history, legal history, and the history of psychology, and he served as the principal consultant to PBS and the BBC for their award-winning series “The Brain” and “The Mind.”
He was a Member of the Board of Consulting Scholars of Princeton University’s James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Senior Fellow of Brigham Young University’s Wheatley Institution, and held faculty positions at Amherst College, Georgetown University, Princeton University and Columbia University. He received his Ph.D. in neuropsychology from the City University of New York, and was President of the two divisions of the American Psychological Association: the Division of History of Psychology, from which he received the Lifetime Achievement Award, and the Division of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, from which he received the Distinguished Contribution Award.
Daniel Robinson came to philosophy by way of the brain sciences, earning a doctorate in Neuropsychology in 1965. His early publications were based on research addressed to information-processing in the visual system and, more generally, in the central nervous system. This background from the outset raised persistent questions ordinarily addressed in philosophy of mind, action theory, philosophy of science and metaphysics. Over the years, Professor Robinson has contributed to the literature in all these areas. Issues of determinism and responsibility are considered at length in his Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to the Present (Harvard, 1996) and Praise and Blame (Princeton, 2002). His arguments against reductionism appear in a number of publications and at book-length in Consciousness and Mental Life (Columbia, 2008). His close study of Kant’s metaphysics is given in his How Is Nature Possible: The Project of Kant’s First Critique (Continuum, 2012).
(sources: https://www.independent.org/person/daniel-n-robinson/ & https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/people/dan-robinson)
